UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-25-2021

State v. Krahn Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48149

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Krahn Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48149" (2021). Not Reported. 6973.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6973

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
1/25/2021 12:03 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRYSTAN KYLE KRAHN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
NO. 48149-2020
)
)
WASHINGTON COUNTY NO. CR44-19-796
)
)
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
________________________
HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9841
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 7
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Krahn’s Motion To Suppress .............. 7
A. Introduction

............................................................................................... 7

B. Standard Of Review............................................................................................. 7
C. The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Krahn’s Motion To
Suppress Because Officer Stratton Did Not Have Reasonable
Suspicion For The Traffic Stop Once He Saw The Properly
Displayed Temporary Permit ............................................................................... 8
1. The District Court’s Interpretation Of I.C. § 49-456(3) Is Inconsistent
With The Statute’s Plain Language And Therefore That Statute Could
Not Be Used To Provide Officer Stratton With Reasonable Suspicion ......... 10
2. Once Officer Stratton Saw Mr. Krahn’s Properly Displayed Permit,
The Officer No Longer Had Authority For The Seizure Because
His Reasonable Suspicion Was Dispelled .................................................... 13
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 17
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ..................................................................................... 17

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)................................................................................... 9, 15
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) ......................................................... 9, 15, 16
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) ................................................................................... 8, 16
State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189 (2017) ........................................................................................ 11
State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546 (Ct. App. 2015) ............................................................................ 15
State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305 (2019) ................................................................................ 7, 10, 15
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405 (2012) ................................................................................ 7, 8, 9
State v. Edwards, 158 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 2015) ........................................................................8
State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584 (Ct. App. 2013)...............................................................................7
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205 (Ct. App. 1998) .........................................................................8
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992)...................................................................................... 16
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2007) .................................................................................... 8, 9
State v. Horton, 164 Idaho 649 (Ct. App. 2018)................................................................... 11, 12
State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96 (Ct. App. 2015) ........................................................................ 7, 15
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016) ................................................................................. 8, 9, 16
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013) ................................................................................... 7, 8
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2014) .............................................................................................7
State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503 (Ct. App. 1996) ...................................................................... 15, 16
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007) .......................................................... 9, 10, 14, 15
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2005).................................................................... 16
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014) ....................................................................................7
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)...............................................................................8
ii

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)................................................................................8
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ....................................................................... 16

Statutes
I.C. § 49-119(9) ........................................................................................................................ 12
I.C. § 49-122(4) ........................................................................................................................ 12
I.C. § 49-236(2) ..........................................................................................................................9
I.C. § 49-426 ...............................................................................................................................9
I.C. § 49-428(1) ........................................................................................................................ 11
I.C. § 49-430 ....................................................................................................................... 11, 12
I.C. § 49-431 ...............................................................................................................................9
I.C. § 49-432 ......................................................................................................................passim
I.C. § 49-434 ............................................................................................................................. 11
I.C. § 49-435 ............................................................................................................................. 11
I.C. § 49-456 ......................................................................................................................passim

Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ...............................................................................................................8

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Trystan Krahn entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine,
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. Mr. Krahn
had moved to suppress evidence following a traffic stop for an expired registration for the
vehicle. However, his vehicle had a valid temporary permit displayed in the rear window that
the officer observed after pulling over Mr. Krahn. Despite seeing the temporary permit, the
officer continued with the traffic stop. On appeal, Mr. Krahn asserts that the district court erred
by denying his motion because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop
upon seeing the properly displayed permit.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In July 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. Krahn with possession of
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.1113.) Mr. Krahn moved to suppress the evidence due to an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(R., pp.39-42.) Specifically, he argued that the police officer did not have a lawful basis to seize
him because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. (R., p.41.) The State
filed a memorandum in support of objection to the motion to suppress.

(R., pp.54-57.)

Mr. Krahn then filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to suppress.
(R., pp.76-78.)
The district court held a hearing on his motion. (Tr. Vol. I,1 p.5, L.1–p.22, L.24.) At the
hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Austin Stratton testified. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.21–p.22,

1

There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited herein as “Tr. Vol. I”, contains the motion
to suppress and sentencing hearings. The second, cited herein as “Tr. Vol. II”, contains the entry
1

L.1.) In addition, the parties stipulated to the admission of Officer Stratton’s body worn camera
video. (Tr. Vol. I, p.14, L.9—p.15, L.9; Joint Exhibit 1.)
The evidence showed that, on July 1, 2019, at around 7:00 p.m., Officer Stratton
observed a blue Honda Civic pull into the parking lot of a Maverick. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.11-19,
p.15, Ls.12-17.) After the vehicle left the parking lot, the officer subsequently initiated a traffic
stop on that vehicle for having an expired registration.2 (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, L.17—p.7, L.20, p.15,
L.25—p.16, L.7; Joint Exhibit 1,3 ~01:12:46—01:12:48.) While walking up to Mr. Krahn’s
vehicle after initiating the stop, Officer Stratton observed a temporary permit in the rear window
of the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.6-19.) Officer Stratton further testified that the temporary tag
was validly placed in the rear window. (Tr. Vol. I, p.16, Ls.8-25.)
of plea hearing. The third contains the preliminary hearing, and that transcript is not cited
herein. Both transcripts cited are contained in the electronic document labeled “Appeal Supplemental Clerks Record.” Since the pagination in that electronic document starts over for
the entry of plea hearing, the transcript for that hearing is cited separately as “Tr. Vol. II”.
2
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Stratton testified that the “registration
returned as canceled and that the vehicle does not currently have a valid registration.” (Tr. Vol.
I, p.6, Ls.19-21.) During cross-examination at the motion to suppress hearing, the following
exchange occurred:
Defense Counsel: “And you indicated that you observed that the license plate which you
ran, that came back registration had expired on the license plate?
Officer Stratton: “Yeah. It had been cancelled.”
Defense Counsel: “Okay. And that was the sole reason you effectuated the traffic stop; is
that right?”
Officer Stratton: “That is correct.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.15, L.25—p.16, L.7.)
However, in the officer’s body worn camera footage, the officer told Mr. Krahn that “the reason
that I stopped you is that your registration on the vehicle is expired.” (Joint Exhibit 1,
~01:12:46—01:12-48.) In its findings of fact, the district court found that “Officer Stratton
initiated a traffic stop on a 2002 blue Honda Civic for expired license plate/vehicle registration.”
(R., p.79.) In its conclusions of law, the district court repeatedly referred to Mr. Krahn’s license
plate as being expired rather than cancelled. (R., pp.81-82.)
3
Where applicable, citations to the video exhibit will identify the relevant time stamp on the
video using the time located in the upper-right corner of the video. It would appear that the time
listed on the video is approximately six hours ahead of the time that the encounter took place. If
quotations to the video are necessary, they are reproduced to the best of appellate counsel’s
ability.
2

Officer Stratton initiated contact with Mr. Krahn, and the officer subsequently obtained
Mr. Krahn’s name from him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.9-12.) The officer ran Mr. Krahn’s information
through dispatch, and the officer discovered that Mr. Krahn’s driver’s license was suspended out
of Montana. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.13-21.) Eventually, the officer asked Mr. Krahn for permission
to search a container in the middle console of the vehicle after returning to the vehicle to discuss
the license suspension. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.3-8, 15-23.) Mr. Krahn handed the container to the
officer, and the officer observed two pills inside.4 (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.3-8.) The officer further
observed a black case on the passenger seat of the vehicle, and he asked Mr. Krahn for
permission to search that container as well. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.9-12.) Mr. Krahn did not
provide consent to a search of the black case. (Tr. Vol. I, p.10, Ls.11-12.) After Mr. Krahn
refused to give consent for a search on that case, Officer Stratton asked a deputy at the scene to
call for a drug dog to arrive at the scene. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.6-12.)
While Officer Stratton was filling out a citation for Mr. Krahn, the drug dog arrived and
eventually alerted on the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.17—p.13, L.12, p.20, L.21—p.21, L.18.)
After the drug dog alerted, Officer Stratton began to search the interior of Mr. Krahn’s vehicle.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.13, L.22.) Ultimately, methamphetamine and paraphernalia were found inside of
the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.24—p.22, L.1.)
After this evidence was presented, the district court took the matter under advisement.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.12-13.) A few weeks after the hearing, the district court issued an Order on
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.79-86.)

4

Mr. Krahn informed Officer Stratton that one of the pills was Viagra and the other pill was for
anxiety. Mr. Krahn told the officer that had been prescribed the anxiety medication sometime
four to five months prior to the stop. (Joint Exhibit 1, ~01:18:58—01:20:02.)
3

First, the district court issued its findings of fact. (R., pp.79-81.) The district court found
the following relevant facts:
(1) Officer Stratton initiated a traffic stop on Mr. Krahn’s vehicle for an expired license plate
or expired vehicle registration. (R., p.79.)
(2) Mr. Krahn’s vehicle had a temporary permit tag in the back window, but the officer did
not see it until after he stopped the vehicle.5 (R., p.79.)
(3) Mr. Krahn’s driver’s license came back suspended through Montana. (R., p.80.)
(4) After discovering that Mr. Krahn’s driver’s license was suspended, the officer returned to
Mr. Krahn’s vehicle and asked for consent to search the vehicle. Mr. Krahn declined to
provide consent for a search. (R., p.80.)
(5) Officer Stratton asked Mr. Krahn for the orange container in the vehicle, and Mr. Krahn
handed that container to the officer. Mr. Krahn told the officer that the pills inside were
Viagra and for anxiety. Mr. Krahn told the officer that he had a valid proscription for the
anxiety medication about four to five months before the stop. (R., p.80.)
(6) Officer Stratton asked for permission to search the black container in the passenger seat
of Mr. Krahn’s vehicle. Mr. Krahn declined to provide consent for a search of that
container. (R., p.80.)

5

The district court further explained in its conclusions of law that “Krahn had a travel permit for
the vehicle, which was valid through the end of the day.” (R., p.81.) The district court also
found that “[h]ere, Officer Stratton stated that he stopped Krahn due to an expired license plate.
Krahn also displayed a valid temporary registration tag in his rearview window.” (R., p.82.)
Furthermore, the district court found that “[a]fter pulling behind Krahn’s vehicle, Officer
Stratton ran the license plate through dispatch. The plate returned expired. At that point, Officer
Stratton had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to believe that Krahn was in
violation of I.C. § 49-456(3).” (R., p.82.)
4

(7) While Officer Stratton was writing a citation for Mr. Krahn, the officer was informed by
dispatch that the vehicle’s registration returned to an individual from Caldwell that was
not Mr. Krahn. (R., p.80.)
(8) Eventually, a K-9 unit arrived and alerted on the vehicle. (R., p.81.)
(9) After the alert on the vehicle, the officers searched the vehicle. The officers eventually
discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia during that search. (R., p.81.)
In its conclusions of law, the district court found that the motion to suppress was timely
and that Mr. Krahn had standing to contest the seizure and search of the vehicle. (R., p.81.) The
district court ultimately held that “[r]egardless of the fact that Krahn had a valid temporary tag
displayed on his rear window, I.C. § 49-456(3) makes it unlawful to display the expired license
plate.”6 (R., p.82.) The district court interpreted I.C. § 49-456(3) as also making it unlawful to
drive with an expired license plate. (R., p.82.) The district court also concluded that Officer
Stratton did not improperly extend the stop. (R., pp.83-85.) Ultimately, the district court denied
Mr. Krahn’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.79-86.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Krahn entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
felony possession of a controlled substance, and the other charges were dismissed.7 (R., pp.9198; Tr. Vol. II, p.4, Ls.16-24, p.6, Ls.4-19, p.12, Ls.12-18.) At sentencing, the district court
withheld judgment and placed Mr. Krahn on probation for three years. (R., pp.109-12, Tr. Vol. I,
p.28, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Krahn filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.116-18.)

6

I.C. § 49-456(3) states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person: . . . (3) To display or cause or
permit to be displayed, or to have in possession any registration card or license plate knowing the
same to be fictitious or to have been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered.”
7
The plea agreement was for both a conditional plea that reserved Mr. Krahn’s right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress and a binding agreement on the district court as to the
sentence to be imposed. (R., pp.91-98; Tr. Vol. II, p.8, L.11—p.10, L.21.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Krahn’s motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Krahn’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Krahn contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress

because Officer Stratton did not have reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop once he
saw a properly displayed temporary permit in the rear window of Mr. Krahn’s vehicle.
Mr. Krahn asserts that the district court should have suppressed any evidence obtained from the
unlawful traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.”
Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. The Court “exercises free review over the application and construction
of statutes.” State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3
(2014) (finding that “[w]e exercise free review over statutory interpretation because it is a
question of law.”). Likewise, determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013); State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309 (2019).

7

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Krahn’s Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Stratton Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop Once He Saw
The Properly Displayed Temporary Permit
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that ‘[t]he right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). “Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007)). “Limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” Id. “Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate if there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” State v. Edwards, 158 Idaho
323, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v.
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998)).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
“[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.

8

The duration of a traffic stop is narrowly limited to the stop’s purpose. “An investigative
detention ‘must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.’” Danney, 153 Idaho at 409 (quoting Henage, 143 Idaho at 658). “The scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608
(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). “It is the State’s burden to
demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.”
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
The traffic law at issue here regulates the display of temporary permits (also referred to
as temporary registrations). “Idaho law requires that a motor vehicle be registered and display
license plates when being operated on the highways of this state, subject to certain exceptions.”
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing I.C. § 49-456(1)).8 One exception is
for a temporary permit. Idaho Code § 49-432(4) states:
A temporary permit shall be in a form, and issued under rules adopted by the
board, and shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being operated on
the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.
I.C. § 49-432(4). Here, the district court found that Mr. Krahn had a valid temporary registration
tag in the rear window of his vehicle, but that Officer Stratton “did not see it until after he

8

Idaho Code § 49-456(1) states “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person: (1) To operate or for the
owner to permit the operation upon a highway of any motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer which
is not registered and which does not have attached and displayed the license plates assigned to it
for the current registration year, subject to the exemptions allowed in sections 49-426, 49-431
and 49-432, Idaho Code.” This offense is an infraction. I.C. § 49-236(2).
9

stopped the vehicle.”9 (R., pp.79-81.) The district court applied I.C. § 49-456(3) and found that
I.C. § 49-456(3) “makes it unlawful to display the expired license plate.” (R., p.82.)
Mr. Krahn challenges the district court’s application of I.C. § 49-456(3) to his expired
license plate. He contends that the district court erred by relying on I.C. § 49-456(3) because the
district court’s interpretation of that statute is inconsistent with the statute’s plain language.
Mr. Krahn further asserts that he complied with I.C. § 49-432(4) because his temporary permit
was validly displayed. His properly displayed permit dispelled any reasonable suspicion, similar
to State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007) and State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309 (2019),
and therefore Officer Stratton should have ended the traffic stop without any further
investigation.

1.

The District Court’s Interpretation Of I.C. § 49-456(3) Is Inconsistent With The
Statute’s Plain Language And Therefore That Statute Could Not Be Used To
Provide Officer Stratton With Reasonable Suspicion

In finding that Officer Stratton had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Krahn had committed a
traffic infraction, the district court concluded that “[r]egardless of the fact that Krahn had a valid
temporary tag displayed on his rear window, I.C. § 49-456(3) makes it unlawful to display the
expired license plate.” (R., p.82.) This interpretation of I.C. § 49-456(3) goes well beyond the
statute’s plain language. “Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language. That
language is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. If that language is clear and
unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory

9

Officer Stratton’s testimony at the motion to suppress hearing regarding the display of the
temporary registration tag was as follows:
Defense Counsel: “All right. And when did you first notice that he had a temporary plate
in the window?”
Officer Stratton: “Walking up to the vehicle.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.8, Ls.5-8.)
10

construction.” State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 191 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the issue is whether I.C. § 49-456(3), by its plain language, makes it unlawful to display an
expired vehicle registration.
I.C. § 49-456(3) expressly makes in unlawful to display any “license plate knowing the
same to be fictitious or to have been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered.” The statute, by its
plain language, does not make any prohibitions against the display of an expired license plate. In
the motion to suppress, Mr. Krahn argued that there “is no statute that requires Defendant to
remove the old plates until the new plates arrive.” (R., p.41.) Since there is no statutory
prohibition on displaying an expired license plate when a vehicle has a valid temporary permit,
Mr. Krahn asserted that Officer Stratton did not have reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop.
(R., p.41.) The State, on the other hand, referred to the license plates as “cancelled” in its
objection to the motion to suppress and argued that Mr. Krahn violated the law by displaying a
cancelled license plate.10 (R., p.55).
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Idaho examined whether Idaho’s vehicle registration
laws applied to vehicles displaying an expired license plate from a different state. State v.
Horton, 164 Idaho 649 (Ct. App. 2018). In Horton, the Court examined the application of both
I.C. § 49-456(1)11 and I.C. § 49-43012 for cases involving an expired vehicle registration. Id. at

10

The State asserted that a display of a cancelled license plate was a violation of I.C. § 49-428
rather than I.C. § 49-456(3). I.C. § 49-428(1) provides that “License plates shall be displayed
during the current registration year. The annual registration sticker for the current registration
year shall be displayed on each license plate, except for trailers, semitrailers, and commercial
vehicles over twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds under the provisions of sections 49434 and 49-435, Idaho Code. For the purposes of this title, the license plates together with the
registration stickers shall be considered as license plates for the year designated on the
registration sticker.”
11
While the Court refers to only I.C. § 49-456 throughout the opinion in Horton, footnote 1 from
the opinion only uses the statutory language from I.C. § 49-456(1) when describing I.C. § 49456. There are no references to the statutory language from I.C. § 49-456(3) in Horton.
11

653. The Court held that “although Horton’s vehicle was registered in Washington, the officer
had reasonable suspicion for the stop because Horton was driving her vehicle in Idaho and
because the officer suspected the vehicle, in violation of I.C. §§ 49-430 and 49-456, was not
registered.” Id. Based on the plain language of I.C. §§ 49-430, 49-456(1) and 49-456(3), it
would appear that the legislature intends for vehicles with an expired registration to come under
the purview of either I.C. §§ 49-430 or 49-456(1) depending on the circumstances of the expired
registration.
I.C. § 49-119(9) defines the term registration as meaning the “registration certificate or
certificates and license plate or plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the
registration of vehicles.” I.C. § 49-122(4) defines an unregistered vehicle as meaning “a vehicle
without current registration on file with the department or with the appropriate agency of another
state, unless exempt from registration.” I.C. § 49-430 makes it an infraction to not reregister a
vehicle prior to the expiration of the registration period. I.C. § 49-456(1), on the other hand,
makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle upon a highway when that vehicle (1) is not
registered and (2) does not have its assigned license plates for the current registration year
attached and displayed. Mr. Krahn’s license plates were attached and displayed. There is no
indication in the record, however, about whether Mr. Krahn’s displayed license plates had
expired during “the current registration year.” Therefore, the traffic infraction that could have
given Officer Stratton reasonable suspicion in this case could have been under either I.C. §§ 49430 or 49-456(1).

12

I.C. § 49-430 states that “(1) Reregistration of vehicles shall be accomplished annually or by
registration period in the same manner as the original registration and upon the payment of the
required fee. The director may extend this date as to individuals, counties or the state for not to
exceed forty-five (45) days for good cause shown.
(2) A violation of the provisions of this section shall be an infraction.”
12

Regardless of whichever statute would have applied regarding the expired registration,
I.C. § 49-432(1) allows the department of transportation to issue a temporary permit “in lieu of
registration.”13 I.C. § 49-432(4) requires that “[a] temporary permit shall be in a form, and
issued under rules adopted by the board, and shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is
being operated on the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.” Examining the plain language of
I.C. § 49-432, Mr. Krahn was in compliance with that statute. The district court found that
Mr. Krahn had a valid travel permit for the vehicle and that the temporary registration tag was
validly displayed in his rearview window. (R., pp.81-82.) The district court read beyond the
plain language of I.C. § 49-432(3) in finding that the display of an expired license plate would be
prohibited under that statute. Since I.C. § 49-432(1) allows for the operation of a motor vehicle
with a temporary registration permit “in lieu of registration” upon public highways so long as
that temporary registration permit is validly displayed in accordance with I.C. § 49-432(4),
Mr. Krahn was not in violation of any of Idaho’s vehicle registration laws at the time of the stop.
Therefore, the district court erred in finding that Officer Stratton had reasonable suspicion to
effectuate the stop on Mr. Krahn’s vehicle and in denying Mr. Krahn’s motion to suppress.

2.

Once Officer Stratton Saw Mr. Krahn’s Properly Displayed Permit, The Officer
No Longer Had Authority For The Seizure Because His Reasonable Suspicion
Was Dispelled

Under the plain language interpretation of I.C. § 49-432(4), Mr. Krahn’s permit was
displayed in a prominent place where it could be readily legible. Since Mr. Krahn complied with
the statute, Officer Stratton no longer had a lawful basis to continue the traffic stop once he saw

13

I.C. § 49-456(1) explicitly references I.C. § 49-432 as an exemption to its proscribed conduct.
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the properly displayed permit in Mr. Krahn’s rearview window after the stop but before initiating
contact with Mr. Krahn.
This outcome is similar to State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344 (Ct. App. 2007). In Salois, the
Court of Appeals rejected the State’s position that “a law enforcement officer may stop any
vehicle being operated without license plates, even if the vehicle has a properly displayed
temporary registration, to investigate whether the vehicle is being driven in contravention of
traffic laws.” Id. at 348. The Salois Court reasoned, “The State’s position would allow law
enforcement officers to presume that temporary permits are invalid per se, justifying an officer to
stop a vehicle in order to conduct further inspection concerning the legitimacy of the temporary
permit. We reject that position.” Id. The Court of Appeals held:
[T]he presence of a properly displayed temporary permit, subject to the discussion
below, dispels any reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-456(1). To
hold otherwise would allow law enforcement officers of this state unfettered
discretion to stop each and every vehicle being operated with a temporary
registration to “investigate” its validity. To the contrary, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a traffic stop is initiated, not after.
A temporary permit displayed in compliance with I.C. § 49-432(3)14 carries with
it a presumption of validity, not of invalidity. The mere existence of the properly
placed temporary permit cannot serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion to
allow an officer to stop a vehicle to inspect the permit unless the invalidity of the
permit, such as by improper alteration, is obvious and discernable by the officer
prior to stopping the vehicle.
Id. Salois, therefore, holds that an officer may initiate a traffic stop due to the absence of a
license plate or permit, but the basis for that stop dissipates once it is established that the permit
is properly displayed. Id. Moreover, an officer may only initiate a traffic stop based on a
properly displayed permit if the permit’s invalidity is obvious and discernable to the officer

14

Section (4) of I.C. § 49-432 was formerly codified at Section (3). See I.C. § 49-432(3) (West
2007).
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before the stop. Id.; see also, State v. Case, 159 Idaho 546, 549–52 (Ct. App. 2015) (reaffirming
the reasoning and holding from Salois for dealer plates).
Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court found in State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 311 (2019),
that:
Salois thus left the ordinary person with the same understanding that would be
garnered through a reading of the statute: so long as a valid permit is posted in a
vehicle where ‘readily legible’ at the time of posting and remains posted in that
location while the vehicle travels on a highway, compliance with the statute has
been achieved. Indeed, in Salois, the Court of Appeals held a permit properly
posted enjoys a presumption of validity, given no obvious and discernable errors.
Accordingly, under Salois, Cook would have understood her conduct to be in
compliance with section 49-432(4).
In rejecting the Court of Appeals of Idaho’s rationale from State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 356
P.3d 389 (Ct. App. 2015), the Idaho Supreme Court found that “Here, Cook placed a valid
temporary permit in her rear windshield, where it was readily legible, and it was in that location
while she drove upon the highway. Based on a fair reading of section 49-432(4) and Salois, this
was all she needed to do to comply with the statute.” Cook, 165 Idaho at 312.
Here, the presence of Mr. Krahn’s properly displayed temporary permit dispelled Officer
Stratton’s reasonable suspicion for an expired registration. A traffic stop may “last no longer
than necessary to effectuate” the stop’s purpose. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting Royer,
460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion)). Once Officer Stratton noticed the temporary registration
permit in the rearview window of Mr. Krahn’s vehicle just prior to initiating contact with him,
Officer Stratton no longer had authority for the seizure. 15 See Salois, 144 Idaho at 348; Cook,
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Before the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals held in
State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503 (Ct. App. 1996), that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard allowed a police officer to prolong the detention of an individual during a traffic stop,
even though the officer’s reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop was dispelled. Id. at
505–06. In Reed, the officer initiated a traffic stop for no license plates, but then saw a valid
temporary registration sticker as he approached the vehicle. Id. at 504. Although the officer “no
15

165 Idaho at 311-12; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (“Authority for the seizure thus ends
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”);
Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (same).

Officer Stratton lacked reasonable suspicion to detain

Mr. Krahn once he saw the temporary registration permit and therefore the prolonged seizure
was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; Linze, 161 Idaho
at 608.
The evidence obtained from Officer Stratton’s subsequent search “would not have come
to light but for the government’s unconstitutional conduct” in prolonging the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). Due to the
unlawfully prolonged stop, Mr. Krahn submits that the district court erred by denying his motion
to suppress. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained
through unconstitutional police conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11
(same).

longer had reason to suspect that any unlawful act was being committed,” the officer proceeded
to talk to the driver and ask for his license and registration. Id. During their conversation, the
officer noticed the odor of alcohol. Id. Eventually, the officer arrested the driver for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the officer was “entitled” to
obtain the driver’s identity and insurance information, “even though the reason for that stop had
dissipated.” Id. at 506. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the “slight prolongation of the traffic
stop was a minimal intrusion and was not so burdensome as to outweigh the public interests,”
relying on a balancing test from this Court in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992). In light of
Rodriguez and this Court’s decision in Linze, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Reed no longer
has any precedential value on the legality of prolonged traffic stops. For this reason, Mr. Krahn
submits that Reed should not apply to his case.
16

CONCLUSION
Mr. Krahn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
probation on withheld judgment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2021.
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